INTRODUCTION
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 2 has come a long way since its launch in Marrakech in 2001. As of December 31, 2007, 2,966 CDM projects have been submitted to the CDM Board for validation (UNFCCC, 2008) . It is expected that by 2012, the transition year when the Kyoto Protocol terminates and a new protocol is reckoned to be in place, the CDM Board will have issued Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) equivalent to 800-1,150 million tons of CO 2 (UNDP, 2006:11) . Of these, 42 percent represent partnerships between developed and developing countries. 3 This would be an impressive achievement, and it is believed and expected that the interest in CDM projects by governments and private sector entrepreneurs will extend beyond 2012. While the future of CDM depends on political decisions, it is also affected by the performance of that market, and by the fulfillment of the basic CDM objectives, namely greenhouse gas emission reductions that can be credited to the investor country and at the same time support sustainable development in the host country, as is discussed below. Thus, CDM projects provide a-priori incentives for cooperation between host and investor countries.
The potential of CDM has been studied by different disciplines, addressing different aspects such as efficiency, sustainability, institutions, and development. The views regarding the contribution of CDM towards the development objective are mixed. In a review of the literature on the (potential) impact of the CDM to sustainable development Olsen (2007:84) suggests that "…left to the market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable development." Sirohi (2007) arrives at a similar conclusion for the case of CDM project portfolio in India, but sees the prospect of CDM in developing the energy sector. Sirohi states that (p. 105) "The renewable energy projects may not be able to make any observable decline in the incidence of poverty … but they have immense importance in fostering development of energy resources in India" (that have indirect contribution to poverty reduction and growth). A similar conclusion is reached by Da Cunha et al. (2007) who attempt to assess the potential contribution of the CDM towards the achievement of MDGs in Brazil's remote regions. Their conclusion is that under certain conditions, such as improved market accessibility and synergy 2 According to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, CDM is designed as a regulated market with the premise of cooperation among the parties to the convention and the resulting anticipated payoffs to mitigation efforts involving Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. 3 The remaining projects are presented to the Board "unilaterally" by the host country and do not necessarily involve foreign investors. impact of other rural development policies, CDM projects could help minimize distortions in the access to clean energy resources in remote rural areas. However, Sutter and Parreno (2007:75) conclude that "… there are currently no UNFCCC registered CDM projects that are likely to fulfill the … twofold objectives … of emission reduction and contributing to sustainable development."
Despite the above skepticism, the number of CDM projects submitted to the Board has grown at an increased rate during the 5 years since this program started (Figure 1) . Are there additional attributes that make the CDM attractive to both host and investor countries? From the perspective of the host countries (Annex I), investment in CDM projects can be seen as a means of development assistance, with all derived benefits to them. Thus, certain development attributes may play important roles in explaining levels of investment in CDM projects.
Moreover, with the expectation that the demand for CERs would further increase beyond 2012, it would make sense to examine the factors that determine the location and extent of investment in CDM projects by investor countries. However, the CDM may face a loss of interest from carbon investors given the lead time required in developing and implementing a project. Without a clear signal from policy-makers on post-2012 prospects, the CDM may experience a significant slow down of activity in the near future (Cosbey et al., 2005) .
With a development objective, CDM trends can be explained, using several supply-side variables such as export promotion, political hegemony, donor budget allocations, and donor internal politics, which are mainly political economy variables (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007) . But, CDM trends can also be explained using demand side considerations, where the developing countries formulate policies to Annex B countries' investment in CDM projects (Brechet and Lussis, 2006) .
The literature summarizing the various carbon investment mechanisms and the development of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), Joint Implementation (JI), and CDM projects over time is quite large. Larson and Breustedt (forthcoming) provide a detailed history and background work related to the pilot program of (AIJ) between 1992 and 2001. The history, status, and prospects of the CDM are articulated in detail in Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) and in the references they list. And Larson et al. (1998) review carbon market policies and their recent development. These sources review the extensive literature on the nature and functioning of CDM and the role regulation plays in its evolution. The literature in these sources allow comprehension of the relationship between global environmental agreement on climate and its actual operation in the real world and its relationship to the rest of the economy in terms of promoting low carbon growth.
In this paper we focus on identifying factors that affect levels of cooperation in carbon abatement projects between governments of Annex B (hereafter investor) countries and developing (hereafter host) countries. We focus on examining bilateral and multilateral CDM projects that were submitted to UNFCCC between 2003-2007 in order to provide useful assessment of policy interventions for possible enhancement and extension of the CDM mechanism beyond 2012. We are interested in understanding the grouping of countries in the CDM market, or in other words, what explains cooperation and cooperation level in CDM between certain dyads of countries. We model level of cooperation in CDM to explain incidence in projects between hosts and investor countries, and to understand why certain countries are heavily involved while others are not. We use also different measures of cooperation levels, including the number of joint CDM projects, the amount of CO 2 abatement in the CDM projects 4 and the level of investment in CDM projects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the conceptual framework used for determining the cooperation level in joint CDM investment projects among host and investor countries. Section 3 presents the data sources, the assumptions and procedures used in variable construction, and the empirical specifications of the estimated relationships. The hypotheses regarding the relationship between the various variables in their different estimation contexts are spelled in Section 4. Estimation procedures and empirical results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes, highlights caveats, concludes, and addresses environmental and development policy implications.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We look at CDM joint investment projects between two countries as a cooperative investment decision that is affected by both domestic factors and by economic and political interactions between these countries. We borrow from the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI), as CDM is a subset of FDI. FDI stock or flow represent the level of cooperation among dyad states.
We also rely on theories in the literature on international cooperation developed in the international relations and international economics literature, using variables that explain the level of other interactions between dyads of countries, and applied to the CDM market. In the remainder of the section we relate variables within these categories.
In general, the determinants of cooperation relate to the bilateral characteristics of the pairing -for example trade, or unilateral characteristics of the investor and the host -for example characteristics of their respective energy sectors. With this is mind, cooperation between a given country dyad i and h can be written as:
where C is level of cooperation, D represents the bilateral characteristics of a given host-investor pair and I and H are vectors of variables strictly attributable to investor and host country i and h, respectively. We expect some interaction effects between i and h because certain variables in host countries are linked to considerations by investor countries.
The CDM raised expectations as it seeks to bridge technology gap between developing and developed countries. The Kyoto mechanisms are expected to serve as feedback loop for reducing economic and financial burden of host countries, which is expected to strongly reflect in the fast growing non-OECD countries. Furthermore, CDM is expected to evolve into a form of FDI with opportunities for collaboration for project developers in investor countries to interact with host country investors (UNEP/ GRID-Arendal, 2000) .
In order to analyze the level of engagement in CDM projects by investor and host countries, we apply the theory used for explaining FDI flows and stocks. Dunning (2002) , Nonnemberg (2004) , Nunnenkamp (2002) , and Siegel et al. (2008) provide a wide review of theories used to support the empirical literature, linking variables in host countries and considerations by investor countries. While we include in this section a wide list of variables based on previous relevant work, we will restrict the set of variables we use in the empirical estimation of the level of cooperation to only variables that apply to both host and investor countries.
Several factors enhance investor and host country interest in CDM projects. According to Dunning (1996) the desire of firms in investor countries to seek foreign investments is affected by tax policy in the investor country; transaction cost in investor country and in the host country; and the size and status of the market for the particular product/technology transferred (for discussion on additional variables see Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007) . In the case of the CDM market, one should also add the opportunity cost of meeting the Kyoto CO 2 reduction quota in the investor country. This depends on the country economy structure and growth trajectory, the energy dependency of the economy, the level of CO 2 emission of the economy, and the clean energy resources it possesses (Velasco, 2007; UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2000) .
Vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters an incentive for needed related actions has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Tsur and Zemel, 2008) . Agents that that face harsher environmental conditions would be early adopters of technologies, implement policies, and look for partners to sign treaties to ease their situation, in the case of states sharing a water body (Dinar 2009 ).
But cooperation in the CDM market is not only dependent on country-specific variables.
Joint investment in CDM projects, is a venture between international partners. Higher levels of joint investment indicate a higher degree of cooperation and no investment suggests no cooperation. Therefore, it is conceivable that international relations theories are likely to play some role alongside the profit maximization motives of the parties as in any international cooperation such as trade and FDI. We follow the literature on trade and FDI in the international conflict and cooperation literature (e.g., Polacheck et al., 2007; Dunning 2002) . Below we provide the rationale behind each of the sets of the additional variables we include in the cooperation equation (e.g., trade and governance level).
International Trade
Several empirical studies argue that the extent of trade between countries provides an appropriate measure of their overall relations. Trade is a measure for both openness of a country to the global economy and the interaction between countries. The international relations literature's assessment of the link between trade, conflict, and cooperation has been quite mixed. On the one hand, there has been the general claim that increased trade between countries reduces incidents of militarized conflict between them and promotes peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001) . The fear of losing the gains from trade deters conflict. Along the same lines, it has been argued that nations with cooperative political relations will engage in more trade, while conflictive nations are expected to trade less (Pollins, 1989) . On the other hand, there has been the conjecture that high international trade, interdependence, and conflict are positively related (Waltz, 1979) . Higher interdependence increases frictions among the countries, and therefore may lead to conflict. Barbieri (2002:121) , for example, finds that the higher the interdependence and trade between countries the higher the likelihood of militarized conflict.
International trade also acts as a contract enforcing mechanism. Stein (2003) , who argues that trade increases the likelihood of disputes between countries, also claims that it provides countries with an opportunity to resolve them at a lower level of international conflict. In essence, the coercive potential of trade reduces conflict, the occurrence of political crisis, and the need for militarized actions.
The above examination of the literature leads us to suppose that the level of relations among countries, measured by the extent of trade among them, is an appropriate measure for assessing the likelihood of cooperation negotiations (Neumayer, 2002) . In particular, these studies suggest that the likelihood of a CDM will be relatively higher in the case of better or stronger relations among countries, and will be relatively lower in the case of poorer or weaker relations among countries (Sigman, 2004) .
Enabling Environment: Governance, Regulations, Business Climate
When considering international cooperation, in general, and international investment in specific projects, in particular, domestic institutions may play a major role in either facilitating or inhibiting success of the cooperation-project in question. Dinar et al. (2007) suggest that political, legal, and economic institutions-enabling environment-often sustain the functioning of the state both domestically and internationally. It reflects not only the state's interest in the project but also its ability to enter into, and honor, an investment agreement, which may require financial investments and costs (Congleton 1992: 412-413) . The political stability and enabling institutions of a given state are, therefore, a principal mode to judge the viability of its domestic institutions, its general inclination to negotiate a project agreement and its capacity to support the project.
Politically unstable countries have less institutional capacity to carry a project, and more politically stable countries may in turn have little interest in cooperative ventures with those.
Similarly, investments are not secure and property rights poorly defined in unstable countries characterized by political turmoil (Deacon 1994) . Participating in an agreement requires both competence (also in terms of appropriate investment climate and supporting regulation) and stability inherent in a particular polity, which will in turn be able to honor the signed project agreement (Young 1989:365; Young 1982:287) .
Categories of Variables to Be Used in the Analysis
Based on the discussion in the literature, for the right hand side of the estimated relationship we will construct variables that represent variants of the level of economic activity; variables that represent the energy dependency; variables that measure the level of renewable energy endowments; variables that measure the cost of transactions; variables that measure vulnerability to climate change; variables that measure governance level; and variables that measure international trade among the host and investor countries. In addition, for level of cooperation we will calculate measures CDM incident and variables related to the CDM activities.
DATA DESCRIPTION, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Data used in this study are derived from several different sources. Collected data are then combined and transformed for the purpose of empirical analysis. In particular, individual CDM project-level data are combined with corresponding host and investor country-specific macroeconomic and environmental variables, and alternative empirical models are specified. projects, 1,966 are at validation, 806 are already registered, 42 were rejected (36) or withdrawn (6) and the rest are in various stages of evaluation. The dataset includes 1,246 (42%) unilateral projects, mainly in India, China, and Brazil, and 1,592 (54%) bilateral projects. The rest (128) are multilateral projects with 3-9 investor countries. Because our focus is on cooperation, unilateral projects are excluded from the analysis. We also drop projects that were withdrawn and four projects that include 5 or more country partners. For the remaining multilateral projects, project activities are equally divided and attributed to all plausible dyads. For example, for a CDM project with n investor countries, n separate dyads are formed with the same host. Amount of carbon abatement and capital costs are then equally divided and attributed to n investor countries in the dyads. However, one project is accounted for each of the n dyads because the single project is indivisible. We keep the projects that were subsequently rejected by the CDM board because they indicate propensity to cooperate, which is the subject of this paper. For a subset of projects (1199), we also have information about capital costs (Seres 2007). 5 For the empirical model, we construct four measures of cooperation from this basic data for pairs of countries i and h. We first use a dichotomous variable to distinguish between pairs that do have joint CDM projects and pairs that do not have any project at all. The variable CDM Incidence (CDMI) will get a value of 0 if there is not CDM activity among the countries and a value of 1 if the number of CDM projects is greater than 0. Then we measure the cooperation level, using three variables, namely, Number of Projects (NPRJ), Total CO 2 Abatement (Total CO2 Abatement) in million tones of Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) of CO 2 equivalent and Volume of Investment (VINV) in million constant US dollars. When direct information on project costs is missing (we have only 1199 projects with direct investment cost data), we categorized projects by type (9 types) and size (2 sizes: small and big) and calculated for each and average investment cost value. We then used average investment cost to extrapolate to projects for which we did not have investment cost data.
Description of Data and Variable Construction for the Empirical Analysis
As discussed in the context of equation 1, we use both pair-wise and country characteristics as determinants in our statistical models. For the bilateral measure, we use the level of bilateral trade among the countries (TRD). We also include five additional country characteristics for both host and investor: i) the economic development of the countries (measured in either GDP, or ENR), ii) the energy sources status (REN), iii) climate vulnerabilities of the countries (IVUL), iv) governance level of the countries (GOVR), and v) Ease of Doing Business in the countries (EDB).
While we use only six groups of right hand side variables, we still need to calculate some of them, and the dependent variable, using additional variables. Therefore, we report here all data we have used and which variables have used which variables in their construction. Annual GDP (both in current and 2000 constant US$ absolute and per capita terms), energy and electricity production, import, and consumption (both in absolute and per capita terms), and the volume of CO 2 emissions (in terms of total kiloton of oil equivalent, per capita CO 2 , and CO 2 per dollar of 2000 PPP GDP) data for all countries of the world during 1960-2003 are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank, 2007) . 6 In addition, country level estimates of total energy available from nonrenewable sources (e.g., coal, oil, gas, oil shale, and bitumen) and annual energy available from renewable (e.g., solar, onshore and offshore wind, hydro, geothermal, and biofuels) sources are obtained from Buys et al (2007) . (2007). 8 The first trade variable (TRD 1 ) expresses total trade (the sum of the volume of bilateral imports and exports) between the host and investor countries as a fraction of the sum of the countries' GDPs. The second trade variable (TRD 2 ) measures the total trade (the sum of the volume of bilateral imports and exports) between the host and investor countries as a fraction of their trade with the rest of the world. 9 TRD 1 is referred to as trade importance and TRD 2 is referred to as trade dependency. For a group of N≥2 countries the TRD 1 and TRD 2 (Trade1 and Trade2) are:
Where IMP and EXP are import and export, respectively, t is year, w is the rest of the world, not including any country j and k in N. 8 The definitions of these variables are available in Dinar et al (2007) . Since the IMF trade data are in current $US; country-level GDP in current $US (collected from the WDI of the World Bank) are used to construct the trade variables. 9 For multiple investor countries, TRD 1 expresses trade as the sum of total volume of exports and imports between the host country and each investor country as a fraction of the sum of GDP of each of the country involved in the CDM project. On the other hand, TRD 2 measures the total trade (the sum of the volume of bilateral imports and exports) between the host and each investor country as a fraction of their trade with the rest of the world.
HYPOTHESES
We selected a particular set of variables for inclusion in the regression analysis. These variables were selected because, at least theoretically, each can be attributed to explaining both investor and host countries' desire to cooperate. From the above discussion and based on previous work on FDI and AIJ determinants that resemble behavioral patterns similar to those of CDM (e.g., Agarwal, 1980; Dunning 2002; Nonnemberg et al., 2005; Nonnenkamp 2002; and Larson and Breustedi, 2007) , it is reasonable to hypothesize that, while all other variables are held constant, CDM incident and the level of cooperation between host and investor countries will increase (decrease) with higher (lower) level of economic development; will increase (decrease) with higher (lower) levels of energy use, and thus emission intensities, of its economy. We hypothesize that for an investor country the level of cooperation will decrease (increase) and for host country it will increase (decrease) with more renewable energy resources available in that country; And the more (less) vulnerable to climate change the economies are, the higher (lower) will the cooperation be.
Additional variables included in the empirical models are trade, business environment, and governance. Based on our conceptual framework we expect that CDM incidence and the level of cooperation between host and investor countries will increase (decrease) as trade widens (shrinks); will decrease (increase) as transaction cost of doing business are higher (lower); will increase (decrease) as governance level in the country increases (decreases); will increase (decrease) as vulnerability level in the country increases (decreases); will increase (decrease) as development level in the country increases (decreases); and will decrease (increase) as renewable energy resource levels in the country are higher (lower).
To be specific, we expect 0
NPRJ, VINV, TCO2).
This paper focuses on a relatively narrow set of hypotheses, mainly related to the cooperation aspect of CDM. Additional hypotheses could be about the growth pattern of CDM and whether or not it is affected by the regulation of the carbon product. For example, does growth of CDM follow the same trend as the international trade/FDI between countries or does it follow a curtailed growth path considering the strong role of regulation in approving the carbon assets for trade in CDM. This and similar hypotheses are very relevant and will be addressed in a different paper.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 10
Depending on the characteristics of the dependent variables, appropriate econometric procedures are applied to estimate the incidence and level of CDM cooperation according to the models specified above. The incidence of host and investor countries in CDM activity is represented by a dichotomous variable indicating whether a particular dyad has any CDM activity (the dependent variable is set equal to 1 for those dyads having CDM activity and equal to 0 for those without any CDM activity). The probability that host and investor countries will jointly engage in CDM activity is estimated by regressing the characteristics of the host and investor countries and dyads on the dichotomous variable. Both logit and probit models are employed to estimate the probability.
As described earlier, the level of CDM cooperation between host and investor countries is 
Descriptive Statistics Results
We start by providing a descriptive statistics of project-level variables. Note that we created more variables than we use in the regression analysis because of the interest these variables create. Those variables are not given acronyms. We then move to describe country-level and project-related variables, both for host and investor countries. Finally we provide descriptive statistics of main variables for the dyad-level variables. 11 (128) are multilateral projects with 3-9 participating countries. We dropped the projects that were withdrawn and the projects that include 5 or more country partners (4). We kept the projects that were rejected because they indicate propensity to cooperate, which is the subject of this paper.
Project Level
Therefore our dataset includes 2956 project observations. Eighty two percent of the projects are associated with power generation; 37 percent create hydro, solar and wind energy; and 29 percent create energy from agricultural biomass. Project life ranges between 7 and 30 years.
Mean investment per 1,000 tons of CO 2 abatement is $38,004. Mean electricity generation capacity per project is 31.2 Mwh. And mean per annum abatement of CO2 is 140.6 kiloton of oil equivalent.
Country Level
In the dataset there are 170 host countries (including island countries) and 36 investor countries, many of which are involved in CDM investment. We present the data separately for the host and for the investor countries, in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively.
The mean number of projects per host and investor country is 17 and 54, respectively, but it varies between 0 and 960 for host countries and 0 and 720 for investor countries, (Note that The descriptive statistics of dyad-based variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 3 includes Australia which brings the number of Dyads to 6125.)
Investor countries have higher Average GDP, higher Average Annual Energy Use, better ranking of Ease of Doing Business, better Governance, and lower Impact Vulnerability. However, host countries have significantly much higher endowments of Renewable Energy than do investor countries. As was hypothesized, earlier, we expect that this difference is attractive to investor countries.
Results for the Cooperation Estimates
To reduce complications associated with having the dyad as the observation unit, our variables capture the bilateral nature of the dyad. All variables incorporate values for the two countries in the dyad that are engaged in the CDM activity. In the case of all other variables except Trade,
we use values for host, for investor, and the interaction between investor and the host country. In the case of Trade, we have two variants and both incorporate the values of the host and investor countries into the variable.
We present results for a set of 2,771 country dyads that have all the needed data in all the regression specifications. We also report, in Appendix 3, the results of regressions that have a larger number of observations due to availability of data. All our equation estimates (Tables 6-9) have significant fit with Likelihood Ratio values that are significant at the 1 percent level in all estimates.
Results are presented in Table 6 for the dichotomous CDM Incidence (CDMI). For an investor country, abundant renewable resources imply opportunities to invest in carbon abatement projects at home and less incentive for investments abroad.
Ease of Doing Business (EDB) has the expected negative and significant coefficients in estimates for both host and investor countries in Table 6 where the dependent variable is the number of projects (NPRJ). It has expected negative and significant coefficients for the host country (hst_EDB) in the cases of the other two dependent variables, TCO2 and VINV (Table 7 and 8). However, it has a non-significant coefficient for the investor country in these two tables.
Our interpretation is that EDB is a very important consideration in host countries for CDM investment. It is less important in the case of investor countries. It is important to indicate that higher levels of that variable mean more difficulty of doing business in that country.
Governance (GOVR) is also an important variable in our analysis. It has positive and significant coefficients for inv_Governance variable in all equations, and positive, but not significant coefficients for the hst_Governance variable in several equations. Better governance leads to higher cooperation. The coefficient of the impact vulnerability variable (IVUL) was positive and significant, as expected, in all estimated regressions for both host and investor countries. This means that the higher the vulnerability level of the country, either a host or an investor, the more it will be willing to cooperate in CDM investment for different reasons. For a host country such cooperation means improvement of its development opportunity, and for an investor country this means a lower cost of meeting its CO 2 reduction obligations, and a longterm contribution towards reduction of GHGs.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper we analyzed the CDM market from the point of view of cooperation between developing (host) and developed (investor) countries. We used a dichotomous variable to measure incidence of country involvement in CDM projects and three variants to measure cooperation level, namely number of joint CDM projects, volume of CO 2 abatement that can be realized from the CDM projects, and volume of investment in the CDM projects. All cooperation equation estimates provided robust and consistent results, for all four cooperation variants. We used linear functional forms in the independent variables. We used linear and log transformation for the investment variable. Our results suggest that the variables we usednamely economic development, institutional development, energy structure of the economies, level of country vulnerability to various climate change effects, and international relationship between the host and investor countries -are good predictors of the level of cooperation in CDM projects we may expect. Coefficients of the interaction terms of these variables between the host and investor countries, in most cases, have not been significant.
In deriving conclusions from the analysis, we will start by comparing our results to those of other studies that attempt to explain the level of cooperation between countries. We used trade to explain the level of cooperation in CDM projects. The two trade variables we constructed suggest that countries with strong trade relations, that imply also other types of international relations ties, will be more likely to cooperate over CDM projects. Trade was found in many other studies to be a key in explaining cooperation in water treaties and in FDI.
Trade is only an example of economic ties among the dyad countries. Therefore, the overall conclusion is that any type of active relationships among the dyad countries would lead to higher likelihood of cooperation over CDM.
Another variable that has similar impact in other studies of international cooperation is the level of governance in the country. It is frequently suggested that governance matters and that institutional strength is a prerequisite for better performance, both domestic and international. Other studies that were reviewed earlier suggest as well that higher level of governance makes countries better parties for cooperation over many issues. A similar interpretation can be attributed to the variable measuring ease of doing business. Our results suggest, as it is expected, that the situation in the investor country does not matter. What matters is the level of ease of doing business in the host country. The more difficult it is to do business in a host country, the less it will attract domestic and international investors. It is quite straightforward, but needed empirical proof. Studies on FDI demand and supply identified ease of doing business in the investor (source) country to be negatively correlated with FDI supply.
This was explained by having local entrepreneurs in developing countries look for other markets because they can minimize their transaction cost of doing business at home. Our results suggest the same impact only in the case of using the number of projects as an indicator for the level of cooperation. In other cases this variable's coefficient was not significant.
All other variables measure the natural endowment of a country and thus may be less affected by policy interventions. Our policy discussion would therefore be focused only on the suggestion that international development institutions focus mainly on the strengthening of multilateral interactions between countries and on domestic structural changes and reforms to economies, so that they are better prepared not only to adapt to climate change but also to be able to better cooperate in the CDM market and take advantage of the CDM dividenddevelopment-that results from CDM joint investment.
There are several variables in the cooperation equation specification that are state variables in the sense their level cannot be controlled, at least directly, by policy makers. This leaves the range of policy interventions narrower. Still, Governance and EDB leave sufficient degrees of freedom to policy makers. One issue that has been raised in Carbon Finance discussions is the complications of the CDM project clearance process, which becomes a barrier to CDM project development. Simplifying the CDM project clearance cycle is an important policy option. EDB goes hand in hand with Governance although they are not necessarily correlated. Improved governance in the host and in the investor countries means higher political stability and trust between the countries for business. Finally, trade or other long-term economic activities that connect the countries is an important inhibitor for CDM cooperation. Having a regional or international trade agreement or the like will increase the likelihood of CDM incidence and higher level of cooperation on CDM projects. Note: a ktCO 2 e = Kiloton of oil equivalent. In parentheses are t-values; *** (=0.01); ** (=0.05); * (=0.10). All cost data was recorded in the spreadsheet in the currency units used in the PDD. All cost data were converted into USD using the spot exchange rate on the 20 th of November 2007.
The exchange rates used were included in the dataset.
Perspective in capital cost data
It may be important to note two facts with regard to the capital cost data from CDM project activity.
First, it should not be assumed that the CDM projects have been implemented yet and so capital cost outlays may not have occurred. The CDM project data represents all projects that have been put forth for validation and registration. This may, and often does, occur prior to commitments on capital purchases have been made. However, it is largely expected that these projects will be implemented.
Second, it should not be assumed that the reported capital expenditures on CDM projects are solely attributable to the CDM. In many cases, capital expenditures would have taken place in its absence. For instance, wind farm and hydro projects are implemented to increase the host country's power generation capacity. In the absence of the CDM, it is likely that capital expenditures would have taken place regardless, in order to increase the host country's power generation capacity, albeit with a different technology and less of a capital outlay. However, for certain project types, where there is no revenue stream other than CDM credits, i.e. landfill gas and animal waste flaring projects, it would be fair to assume that the capital cost expenditures are solely attributable to the CDM. 
